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This is a rather ambitious title for a somewhat hurriedly written 
seminar paper for the simple reason that with a transfer system evolving 
and operating over more than fifty years, one does not have a clean slate 
to start from.  Getting things right in such a system,  however messy, is 
far from simple, perhaps impossible.  Besides, federal fiscal relations in 
which  the  transfer  system  plays  a  vital  role  form  only  one  element, 
though  perhaps  the  most  vital,  in  the  complex  web  of  centre-state 
relations in a federation, reflecting inter alia the history and geography of 
the  country  and  the  heterogeneity  of  its  people.    Given  the  political 
compulsions, what may seem 'ideal' from the economic angle may not be 
acceptable.  Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep a federation's transfer 
system  constantly  under  review  in  order  to  identify  its  strengths  and 
weaknesses and correct at least the glaring deficiencies that come to 
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notice  as  otherwise  social  and  economic  development  and  even  the 
stability of the country as a nation may be in peril.  This provides the 
motivation for the exercise undertaken in the present paper.  
Although the system of centre-state transfers in India with the 
institution of Finance Commission (FC) forming its keystone, has often 
been lauded for its virtues, it has come under criticism on several counts 
and  of  late  the  criticisms  have  been  particularly  sharp.    The  faults, 
according to critics, are many and need urgently to be attended to.
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The most serious deficiency of the transfer system, it is widely 
felt, is the perverse incentives it creates for efficiency and fiscal discipline 
among  the  states.  The  dispensation  of  the  Eleventh  Finance 
Commission  (EFC)  came  in  for  particularly  sharp  criticism  for  their 
perceived neglect of efficiency in fiscal management and focussing only 
on  equity.    "The  consideration  of  equity  between  the  States",  it  was 
alleged, "has now been carried to such absurd levels by the Report of 
the  EFC  that  there  was  a  veritable  revolt  by  the  so-called  advanced 
States against the award of the Commission" (Godbole, 2001).  
On the other hand there are those who put a premium on equity 
and think like Musgrave (1999) that a major function of a federation is to 
redistribute  resources  among  the  constituent  units  to  bring  about  a 
measure of equality in the provision of public services to all citizens of 
the country no matter where they reside.  In their view India's transfer 
system  has  gone  only  some  way  in  achieving  this  objective.  Careful 
analysts are of the view  that "although the transfer system on the whole 
has an equalising effect,  it is not designed to offset shortfall in fiscal 
capacity and cost disabilities fully" (Rao and Singh, 2002).  Using pooled 
data for 15 major States for the years 1990-91 to 1999-00 in a 'fixed 
effects' model, Chakraborty (2003) finds that aggregate transfers are a 
positive (and not negative) function of per capita income, suggesting that 
the mechanism of centre-state transfers in operation in India has been 
very regressive.  Progressivity  if any, is also undone to a considerable 
extent by transfers that take place in many invisible ways (Rao, 1997) . 
Another point of criticism voiced particularly by the states has 
been that the transfers have not been adequate to bridge the vertical 
gap.   A larger proportion of central revenues,  it is contended,  should 
have devolved than has taken place in view of the inherent limitations of 5
their  tax  power  relative  to  their  expenditure  responsibilities under the 
constitution.
2      Thus,  the  vertical  and  horizontal  imbalances  that  all 
federal systems have to face remain large and the transfer system has 
not  been  able  to  redress  them  adequately  or  satisfactorily.    On  the 
contrary,  it  has  been  a  major  factor  in  the  acute  fiscal  stress  felt  all 
round.  In other words, the transfer system is gravely flawed and calls for 
some radical reform. 
The reform if they are to be effective have to be wide ranging 
embracing the entire gamut of federal fiscal relations starting from the 
existing scheme of assignment of power and functions of the different 
level of government envisaged in the constitution. Such a task is beyond 
the  scope  of  this  paper.  The  paper  seeks  to  suggest  a  conceptual 
framework  for  designing a rational  system of centre-state transfers in 
India and explore how such a system can be developed and used as a 
guide for the Finance Commission in its task of adjudicating the flow of 
central  revenue  to  the  states.    In  section  II  we  briefly  go  over  the 
rationale for intergovernmental transfers with particular reference to the 
equity vs. efficiency debate.  Section III provides a brief review of how 
the transfer system that is currently in operation in India measures up 
against what may be considered the ideal.  In section IV an attempt is 
made to illustrate how a conceptually desirable system could be evolved, 
note the obstacles that are likely to be encountered in implementing such 
a  system  and  how  the  transition  can  be  made  to  the  recommended 
regime.  Section V concludes.
II. Integovernmental Transfers in Federations 
and their Rationale:The Equity Vs. 
Efficiency Debate
The intergovernmental transfers that are in vogue in federations, 
their  rationale,  relative  merits  and  drawbacks  have  been  the  subject 
matter of extensive discussion in the federalism literature and are well 
known.
3  We do not intend to go into them in detail.  However, to set the 
perspective a brief overview may be in order. 6
The  reasons  commonly  advanced  in  justification  of  revenue 
transfer from the centre to subnational governments in a federation fall 
broadly under three categories.  One, transfers are needed to redress 
the vertical imbalance or the fiscal gap that stems from the asymmetric 
devolution of functions and tax powers among different governmental 
levels  which  is  common  in  federations.  Two,  given  that  subnational 
activities can generate externalities that are not taken into account by the 
jurisdictions where they originate, public goods may be under or over-
produced.    Specific  purpose,  open  ended  and  matching  grants  are 
required to be provided by the central government so that the goods in 
question are produced to the socially optimal level.  The third and the 
most controversial ground is that transfers from the centre designed to 
secure  fiscal  equalization  among  the  states  are  necessary,  indeed, 
imperative, in the interest of both equity and efficiency.  
Unconditional tax reimbursement transfers from the centre to the 
states or revenue sharing derive their rationale from the advantage of 
centralising  tax  power  and  decentralising  expenditure  functions.    In 
principle, the surplus of the revenue collected by the centre over what is 
required by it to meet its own expenditures, described as "the optimal 
fiscal  gap"  should  be  distributed  among  the  states  in  the  form  of 
lumpsum  unconditional  grants  (Petchy,  Shapiro,  and  Walsh  1997, 
hereafter P-S-W). The "optimal" fiscal gap is not easy to quantify but in 
many federations transfers are made to meet the vertical gap.  In India 
too, the case for sharing income tax and union excise duties stipulated in 
the constitution was based primarily on this reasoning. The practice of 
providing tax reimbursement transfers explicitly via revenue sharing or 
through  weights  for  "collection"  or  "contribution"  in  the  FC's  tax 
devolution  formula  has been given up.  But,  the need to redress the 
vertical imbalance is clearly recognised in the Indian Constitution and 
hence the mandate for compulsory sharing of union tax revenue with the 
states.  The crucial question is, given the sharp differences in the fiscal 
capacities among the states how does one determine what is the right 
amount of transfer that can close the vertical gap?
As noted already, the optimal fiscal gap is not simple to figure 
out.  It requires an assessment of what the centre can be reasonably 
expected to collect by exercising its revenue raising powers and what 
would be its legitimate expenditure needs.  This is a formidable task, and 
no FC has made any serious attempt to assess the vertical fiscal gap 
that could be regarded as "optimal" although this has been a recurring 7
theme in the criticisms of the FCs (vide Godbole 2001, Rao and Sen, 
1996).  Although an assessment is made of the centre's resources to 
arrive at what would be devolved to the states after meeting the union 
government's expenditures, based on certain norms of tax buoyancy and 
reasonable assumptions regarding growth of current expenditures, the 
projections  of  the  FCs  are  rooted  largely  in  history,  and  only  some 
adjustments are made to the actual budget figures of the base year from 
which  the  projections  are  made  relying  on  plausible  assumptions 
regarding the likely macro scenario (GDP growth, inflation and so on).  
The "devolvable" share of centre's revenue can scarcely be called an 
approximation of the optimal (vertical) fiscal gap.  After all, what should 
be legitimate expenditure needs of the union is a matter for Parliament to 
decide.  
Nevertheless, the EFC, for the first time, had attempted to put a 
figure for closing the vertical gap (viz., 37.5 percent of centre's revenues) 
based  on  a  reasonable  assessment  of  the  centre's  resources  and 
expenditure needs in a macro framework, and proceeded to allocate the 
transfers to the states within this overall limit (though confining attention 
while making its recommendations to the non-plan side of the budget).  
However, as it turned out, in the first three years of the reference period 
of the EFC the transfers have fallen short of the stipulated target level.  
As a percentage of GDP, the transfers have been markedly below what 
the EFC had anticipated in its projections, largely because of sluggish 
growth  of  the  centre's  tax  revenue.
4    Thus,  while  with  the  80
th
amendment to the constitution, bringing all union taxes into the divisible 
pool a major source of complaint regarding inadequate sharing of central 
taxes (and their buoyancies) has been removed, the stability that was 
hoped for in tax devolution has not been achieved.  This has affected 
particularly  badly  the  states  that  depend  heavily  on  central  tax 
devolution.  Perhaps some floor based on a reasonable assumption of 
buoyancy in central taxes needs to be fixed in the interest of stability.  A 
measure of flexibility  another desirable attribute of the transfer system 
 can also be built into the transfers by providing for a variation in the 
central revenue sharing within a specified margin in order that both 'pain' 
and 'gain' of cyclical fluctuations (though not of the centre's inadequacy 
in revenue effort) are shared fairly between the two levels of government.
A more practicable approach, useful for many purposes, is, as 
suggested by Bird and Smart (2002), to take the vertical fiscal balance 
as being achieved when expenditures and revenues (including transfers) 8
are  balanced  for  the  richest  state in  the federalism measured on the 
basis  of  its  capacity  to  raise  resources  on  its  own.    Under  such  a 
scheme, poorer states will still face a fiscal gap but it would be more 
appropriate to consider such gaps as part of the problem of achieving 
horizontal fiscal balance among the states rather than vertical balance 
between the centre and the states.
The  second  category  of  transfers  that  are  made  by  central 
governments in federations are meant to take care of the externalities 
that  are  generated  by  the  activities  of  subnational  governments.  
"Inefficient, non-cooperative equlibria" are cited in justification for central 
transfers  to  ensure  that  public  goods  supplied  by  lower  level 
governments  are  optimally  produced.    These  are  generally  specific 
purpose,  open-ended  matching  grants.    If  optimally  designed,  these 
transfers help to induce increased provision of public goods at state/local 
levels to an extent that just neutralises the tendencies of states to under-
provide through strategic behaviour where the externalities are positive 
(and  conversely  when  these  are  negative)  (P-S-W,  1997).  However, 
quantifying externalities is far from simple.
Transfers  to  meet  horizontal  imbalances    "the  equalisation 
grants"  which constitute the bulk of the transfers in many federations 
are even more intractable and controversial, particularly because of the 
perceived conflict between equity and efficiency that such transfers are 
believed  to  involve.    Since,  as  noted,  the  tilt  towards  equity  in  the 
transfers recommended by the FCs and particularly the EFC has come in 
for  severe  criticism,  based  on  a  misperception  of  the  rationale  for 
equalization and its costs and benefits some discussion of the equity and 
efficiency  issues  involved  in  equalisation  transfer  may  not  be  out  of 
place.
Grants are made in most federations to equalise fiscal capacities 
or  to  reduce  interjurisdictional  inequalities  in  the  standards  of  public 
services.  These grants may be given in the form of equalising need-
adjusted  revenue  obtained  at  a  specified  common  level  of  tax  rate.  
Countries  in  which  such  grants  have  been  used  extensively  include  
Germany, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada.  In selective form, these 
are used also in the USA (Musgrave, 1999, p. 167).  Contrary to what is 
commonly  thought,  the  case  for  equalisation  grants  rests  on  both 
efficiency as well as equity grounds.9
The efficiency arguments for equalisation proceed mainly on the 
reasoning  that  in  the  presence  of  inter-state  disparities  in  fiscal 
capacities fiscally induced migration may take place as the richer states 
can offer higher net fiscal benefits (NFB) than the poorer ones and such 
migration  may  not  be  related  to  labour  productivity  differential  in  the 
respective states.  That is to say, while migration may serve to maximise 
the country's output by equalising the marginal products of labour across 
regions,  in  the  presence  of  differential  NFBs,  the  differentials  in 
productivity may not get equalised and so it is necessary to ensure that 
the NFBs are equalised through interjurisdictional transfers.  Strictly, one 
may  argue,  equalisation  of  NFBs  should  be  secured  through  inter-
personal  and  not  inter-state  transfers.    However,  inter-institutional  
equality  of  NFB,  being  infeasible,  inter-jurisdictional  transfers  are 
considered the only alternative (Musgrave, 1999).
The case for equalisation for efficiency reasons is questioned by 
some  by  pointing  to  the  possibility  that  taxes  and  government 
expenditures get capitalised in the costs of goods and services.  Where 
these  are  fully  capitalised,    equalisation  transfers  of  a  general,  non-
matching variety cannot be justified on either equity or efficiency grounds 
(Shah, 1996).  In the real world, however, full capitalisation is rare and so 
equalisation transfers are justifiable on efficiency considerations alone.
"Equity"  lends  even  stronger  support  for  equalisation.    In  the 
federal  context, its operational  implication is that differences in  NFBs 
arising from decentralization where fiscal capacity of the constituent units 
differ  sharply  ought  to  be  undone.  Thus,  the  reasons  that  call  for 
equalisation for efficiency call for them also on horizontal equity grounds.  
However, equalisation is not an instrument for redistributing income.  It is 
an instrument for "facilitating equal treatment of equals by the overall 
public sector" (Boadway, 1998).  Equalisation also serves to secure a 
level playing field for intergovernmental competition which it is strongly 
believed, makes for efficiency in the public sector (Breton, 1995). 
Mandated  by  Article  36(2)  of  the  country's  constitution, 
equalisation grants now constitute the dominant component of federal 
transfers to provinces in Canada, constituting a central pillar of Canada's 
fiscal federalism
5 (Boadway, 1998).  These are unconditional transfers, 
the rationale for which is derived from two 'overarching' principles viz., 'a 
federal rationale' and 'a citizenship rationale': paralleling in a way, the
concern for vertical and horizontal equity in the federal setting.  For the 10
federal  principle  to  be  meaningful,  each  level  of  government  in  the 
federation  should  have  the  requisite  financial  means  and  financial 
security  to carry out its constitutional  responsibilities.   The citizenship 
rationale predicates that all citizens of a federation wherever they may 
live should have access to certain key economic and social rights - 'rights 
that  ought  to  attend  citizenship  as  it  were'  (Courchene,  1998).  
Equalisation transfers also serve as an aid to the stability of the nation -
"a  glue  so  to  say",  to  keep  a  heterogeneous  population  together 
(Boadway, 1998).
From another angle (which lends support to the efficiency case 
for equalisation), it is argued, federalism may entail certain costs in terms 
of uniformity of public services to the constituents in that certain functions 
are centralised and so they may not be as varied as preferences would 
like  them  to  be,  although  they  have  to  bear  the cost  through central 
taxes.  At the same time, they also confer many benefits which are well 
known and so, yield a surplus or excess of benefits over the uniformity 
and  other  costs.  This  provides  the  rationale  for  lump-sum  transfers 
between member states.
6  The creation of the system of equalisation in 
Australia  can  be  explained  partly  by  the  "stability  and  compensatory 
motive" (P-S-W, 1997).  Substantial interregional transfers are in vogue 
even  in  federations  that  do  not  attach  much  weight  to  distributive 
transfers for explicit equalisation of fiscal capacity among regions.  
It  is noteworthy that  the MacDougall Report (1977) on public 
finance  in  the  EU  indicated  that  explicit  interregional  transfers  are 
desirable in the interests of stability and cohesion of the emerging federal 
type  arrangement  in  Europe  in  the  face  of  loss  of  exchange  rate 
mechanism and independent monetary policy instrument for adjustment 
and the need to ensure some degree of convergence in the economic 
performance  of  member-states  to  ensure  a  sustainable  degree  of 
economic  integration.  The  recommendations  of  the  Report  led  to  the 
creation of the mechanism of "structural funds" which make transfers to 
lagging regions in the EU amounting to 2 to 3 percent of national GDP in 
several countries.  The Maastricht Treaty proposed a new cohesion fund 
for providing additional  integration transfers to secure greater political 
and social stability as well as economic convergence in the backdrop of 
economic  reforms  that  will  underpin  a  single  market  and  common 
currency (P-S-W, 1997, p. 116).11
The  scheme  of  transfers  envisaged  in  the  Indian Constitution 
bears ample evidence of the awareness of the basic rationale for which 
intergovernmental transfers are provided for in a federation.  Sharing of 
tax  revenues  raised  by  the  centre  is  explicitly  mandated  in  the 
constitution (Article 280) in recognition of the vertical imbalance implicit 
in  the  assignment  of  the  powers  and  functions  to  the  two  levels  of 
government (the 'federal rationale').  The constitution also authorises the 
centre  (and  the  states)  to  make  grants  for  any  public  purpose  which 
presumably  embraces  the  case  for  spillovers  (Article  282).   Although 
redistribution or equalisation does not figure in the way, it is explicated in 
the Canadian Constitution, the fact that the grants-in-aid to be provided 
by  the  FC  are  required  to  be  determined  on  an  assessment  of  the 
budgetary needs of individual states is taken to signify, quite rightly, a 
mandate for equalisaton at least to a reasonable extent (the 'citizenship' 
rationale).
However, as noted at the outset, there is a widespread feeling 
that  the  transfers  that  are  actually  in  operation  do  not  possess  the 
attributes of what is regarded as a good transfer system.  The transfers 
have  not  been  able  to  address  either  vertical  or  horizontal  balances 
adequately.  On the other hand, they have bred fiscal laxity all round.
III.   Weaknesses of Existing Transfer System in 
India: The Underlying Factors
The deficiencies stem mainly from:
 Multiplicity  of  transfer  channels  each  following  its  own 
criteria/formula.
 Faulty design of the FC transfers.
 Institutional weaknesses of the system.
While the constitution envisaged the FC to be the prime channel 
for routing the flow of central revenue to states, right from the beginning, 12
nearly  40  percent  of  the  transfers  have  taken  place  through  other 
channels, mainly Planning Commission (PC) and the Ministry of Finance 
and other central agencies.  With a multiplicity of agencies dispensing 
federal  funds    the  FC,  the  Planning  Commission  and  the  Union 
ministries, and the emergence of foreign aid agencies also as sources of 
conditional funds routed under "additional central assistance" for state 
plans, it has not been possible to take an integrated view of the central 
transfers.  In the absence of relevant data even their distribution among 
the states cannot be found out.  
The transfers arbitrated by FC (called statutory transfers) which 
still dominate the transfer scene accounting for over 60 percent of the 
total revenue transfers, suffer from many deficiencies arising mainly from 
the following: 
 Limitations on the scope of FC's transfer, with the exclusion of plan 
revenue expenditure and so plan grants from their purview.
 Methodological weaknesses and reliance on "gap-filling" approach.
 Lack  of  clear  focus  or  purposiveness  in  the  transfers  -  with  a 
multiplicity  of  objectives  sought  to  be  pursued  simultaneously, 
cancelling out their effects in some instances.  
The cumulative effect of all these has been that the transfers end 
up with a bias against poorer states, despite the weight given to relative 
poverty (as measured by the 'distance' of their per capita income etc. 
from the advanced states) in the tax devolution formulae.  Disparities in 
the per capita revenue expenditure on basic  social  services and post 
devolution non-plan revenue implies have remained large and so have 
been  the  per  capita  post-devolution  non-plan  revenue  surpluses.  
Consequently,  already  advanced  states  could  undertake  larger 
development programmes accentuating the inter-State disparities further. 
For all its tilt towards equity even under the dispensation of the EFC, per 
capita  revenue  capacity  of  the  states  after  devolution  and  statutory 
grants, remained sharply unequal.  Bihar's revenue capacity for instance 
remained  below  50  percent  of  Punjab's  throughout  the  award  period 
2000-2005 (Table 1). On the other hand, there is reasons to believe that 
the  transfers  have  generated  perverse  incentives  for  fiscal  discipline 
because of the gap filling approach of the FCs.  In several instances 13
especially in the case of special category states, the transfers seem to 
have created a dependency syndrome. 
The  risks  inherent  in  intergovernmental  transfers  because  of 
perverse incentives for fiscal discipline among recipient governments 
with the snapping of the Wicksellion connection - has been the subject of 
considerable  discussion  in  the  recent  literature  on  intergovernmental 
transfers.
The  prescriptions  to  guard  against  the  undesirable  incentive 
outcome of transfers focus invariably on the need to anchor the transfers 
on a normative determination of the revenue capacity and expenditure 
needs of the recipient governments.  Clearly, if the transfers are not to 
act  as  a  dampener  on  the  revenue  raising  efforts  of  subnational  
governments, equalisation transfers should be designed to provide each 
level of government with sufficient funds,  own-source revenue raised 
by exercising at least average diligence plus transfers   to deliver a 
pre-determined (normative) level of services. (Whether differentials in the 
cost  of  providing  services  should  be  taken  into  account  is  open  to 
debate,  one  view  being  that  they  should  not,  in  consideration  of  the 
efficiency of labour migration).  Transfers based on objective norms of 
capacity create no disincentive effect as the amount received is neither 
larger  when  the  recipient  government's  fiscal  effort  is  lower  or 
expenditures are 'extravagant' judged by normal prudence and practices, 
nor smaller when the effort is higher (Bird and Smart, 2002).
Not that the FCs have been unaware of this logic of 'norms'.  In 
fact no FC so far has gone entirely by the deficits projected by the state 
governments  in  their  memoranda.    Right  from  the  First,  all  of  them 
invariably  carried  out  their  own  assessment  for  each  state  based  on 
certain  norms.    But  'history'  or  the  'actuals'  have  still  dominated  the 
outcomes because no FC so far has found it possible to adopt a fully 
normative approach all along the line; the norms have pertained mainly 
to the growth rates of revenues and expenditures for the quenquennial 
projections.   The Ninth FC,  for the first time made a valiant effort to 
incorporate norms of both capacity and need and did go some way in 
that direction although they had to moderate their norm-based transfer 
scheme to avoid severe disruption.  The Tenth FC more or less followed 
the earlier practices with again some limited adjustments and projections 
based on 'reasonable' assumptions.  The EFC again made some effort to 
introduce norms and commissioned studies by experts to set up norms 14
objectively but their effort did not bear fruit and so the 'tyranny of the 
base year' (that is, the practice of making projections from the actuals of 
the base year, however adjusted) persisted.  
The reasons advanced by the EFC for its inability to go by norms 
suggested by the studies commissioned by them are set out in Chapter 
V of their Report of June 2000 (vide paragraphs 5.8 to 5.20).  Briefly, in 
estimating taxable capacity, the basic problem was that the regression 
equations used for determining the capacities of the state relied upon a 
number of variables identified in this regard along with some selected 
dummy variables, that raised the question as to which of the variables 
could be considered to be within the control of the states and which were 
not.    Then  there  were  acute  data  problem  regarding  the  explanatory 
variables.    The  results  were  also  found  to  be  sensitive  to  the 
assumptions regarding the combination of variables used.  Hence the 
EFC  decided  to  proceed  on  the  basis  of  some  "broad  judgements" 
regarding the taxable capacity of the state" (para 5.11).
The  task of setting up norms for expenditure 'needs' is much 
more intractable than for revenue.  The reasons are several; the 'needs' 
vary  depending  upon  many  factors  apart  from  the  level  of  income, 
consumption and structure of the state's economy and also factors such 
as the demographic composition of the population (the age profile, the 
number  of  school  going  children  etc.),  terrain,  special  problems  (like 
insurgency).  What is more, in a truly decentralised system, the decisions 
regarding what should be the size and composition of the public sector at 
the  state/local  level  must  be  left  to  the  choice  of  the  citizens  of  the 
jurisdiction concerned.  Any attempt to impose a norm of expenditure in a 
country as diverse as India cannot but be regarded as an intrusion on the 
federal  structure  of  the  polity.    Nevertheless,  since  the  states  are all 
dependent  on  the centre for meeting their  vertical gap,  in  fairness,  it 
cannot be left entirely to the states to decide what should be the level, 
though  not  the  composition,  of  their  expenditure  as  otherwise  the 
demand for funds from the centre would reach impossible proportions.  
Hence,  some  norms  for  expenditures  too  have  to  be  followed  in  the 
deciding  what  should  be  the  legitimate  share  of  a  state  in  central 
transfers and all FCs have tried to project the expenditures of the states 
on the basis of some reasonable criteria  instead of going entirely by 
what the states project.  However, these efforts have not gone very far 
and as in the case of revenue, or perhaps to a greater extent, 'history' (in 
the form of committed expenditures) has dominated the scene.  15
The NFC made a serious attempt to set up expenditure norms 
for assessing the revenue needs of the states but they were not adopted 
fully  when  it  came  to  the  question  of  assessment  of  the  needs  of 
individual states.
7  The EFC made another attempt to set up norms of 
expenditure needs based on objective criteria and as already mentioned
had  commissioned  a  study  for  the  purpose.  Based  on  regression 
equations with selected variables the study came out with estimates of 
revenue  expenditure  of  the  states,  individually  for  the  main  items 
excluding interest payments, pension and a few other items.  Although  
they met the standard statistical tests, the EFC did not find the estimates 
usable mainly because "in several cases the estimates were way out of 
alignment with the actual expenditure" and "imposition of norms derived 
statistically would be too disruptive".  Another reason advanced was that 
"the expenditure needs of a state for purposes of equalisation should be 
viewed  in  juxtaposition  with  or  as  supplement  to  revenue  capacity 
equalisation transfers and not in isolation".  Then there were acute data 
problems.  The EFC therefore felt that there was no alternative but to use 
only  some  of  the  normative  principles  in  estimating  the  revenue 
expenditure needs of the states in the base year in a limited way which 
was explained in some detail in the Commission's report (para 5.19 and 
5.20).
However,  as  is  repeatedly  emphasised  in  the  literature,  if 
equalisation  transfers  are  not  to  generate  wrong  signals  for  fiscal 
prudence and at the same time serve the objective of equalisation, there 
is no escape from a 'normative approach', even if, some adjustments are 
felt  necessary  to  help  the  transition  to  a  rational  system  and  avoid 
unacceptable disruption in the functioning of governments. 
Exercises  were  carried  out  for  this  paper  based  on  some 
plausible  and  in  our  view  acceptable  assumptions  to  see  how  the 
transfers would look like, if determined normatively.  The methodology 
adopted in brief and the results are set out in the section that follows.  
The exercises cover only the non-special category states excluding Goa.  
Goa is left out as it is an outlier in most respects.16
IV. Normative Revenue Transfers in the Indian 
Context: Likely Dimensions
Briefly, the methodology consists of the following.  First, we work 
out what would be the revenue, tax and non-tax, that each state can 
raise by making average effort. For estimating the average on the tax 
side we divide the states into two groups: high income (HI) in one group, 
and middle and low income (MI/LI) in the other.  For HI group the mean 
is taken to be the average while for MI/LI group the median is chosen as 
a fair basis of estimating revenue potential.  We do not make any attempt 
to follow the representative tax system approach because of data as well 
as conceptual difficulties arising from the diversity of tax practices among 
the  states.    Applying  the  normative  tax  ratio  defined  as  ) (
_
T   to  the 
GSDP, the tax potential of state i is taken as 
_




i T is the normative tax revenue for the state in question.  
For non-tax revenue, we assume that it represents largely the 
recovery of cost of services provided by the government (of course this 
head comprises diverse items like state lotteries, royalties from mines, 
interest/dividends on loans/investments.).  Given the limitation of time we 
thought it expedient to apply a simple norm as defined below for non-tax 
revenue by taking the ratio of revenue raised from non-tax sources as a 
proportion of their revenue expenditure excluding interest payments and 
pension.  The ratio of the best performing states in the two groups of 
states viz. HI & MI/LI was taken as the norm for the respective groups.  
The  assumptions  underlying  the  norms  adopted  by  us  for  estimating 
revenue potential and expenditure needs are spelled out in some more 
detail in the appendix.
Having set up the norms of revenue and revenue expenditures in 
this way, we next computed the revenue (tax and non-tax) that a state 
can reasonably be expected to raise and the level of expenditure which 
can  be  regarded  as  legitimate  and  unavoidable,  and  thereby  the 17
normative deficit.   This, in  our view,  is the amount of union revenue 
which if transferred to the states would help to bridge both vertical and 
horizontal  imbalances  in  the  system  to  a  reasonable  extent  
"reasonable"  in  the  sense  that  this  would  equalise  the  revenue  and 
revenue expenditure of all states at a comparable level if every state 
made the average effort to exploit its revenue potential.  The "normative 
gap" in our scheme refers to the aggregate gap in the revenue account 
(that  is, comprising revenue expenditure on both 'plan' and 'non-plan' 
account).  We call these as "normative transfers".  
The amounts that would work out as normative transfers for the 
years  1995-96 to 2001-2002 and also 1987-88 taken as a benchmark, if 
the norms proposed here were followed,  are set out in Table 2.  To have 
an  idea  of  how  the  normative  transfers  compare  with  the  revenue 
transfers  that  have  actually  taken  place,  the  ratios  of  the  actual  to 
normative transfers averaged over the years in view grouped under the 
reference periods of the Tenth and the Eleventh Finance Commission for 
each  of  the  14  states  are  given  in  Table  3.  Table  4  presents  the 
normative transfers as a ratio of actual deficit (before transfer).  Table 5 
shows the ratios of actual transfers to the actual pre-transfer deficits of 
each state.
It must be added, the exercises have many limitations.  They are 
too aggregative and take no account of the heterogeneity of either the 
revenue sources or the components of  expenditures or the non-linearity 
in  the  cost  estimates of providing public services made in  per capita 
terms.  Even  so,  the  exercises  may  serve  to  indicate  the  broad 
dimensions of the changes in the inter-state revenue transfers that may 
be required if normative principles are followed.  The tables reveal some 
striking facts that deserve close attention in the exploration of a rational 
system of transfer.  These are highlighted below.
 If  the transfers were to achieve equalisation of the level of public 
services proxied by per capita revenue expenditure across all states 
at  a  level  now  obtaining  among  middle  income  states,  assuming 
reasonably  comparable  revenue  effort  on  the part of every state, 
then the transfers will need to go up substantially for the majority of 
the middle and low income states. The transfers now taking place fall 
far short of the normative transfers in all the low and middle income 
states. This is brought out clearly in Table 3.  Taking the average of 
the  three  years  of  the  EFC's  reference  period,  the  proportion  of 18
actual to normative transfers varies from 43 percent in the case of 
Bihar  to  79  percent  for  West  Bengal.   In contrast,  the proportion 
exceeds 100 percent for all the high-income states except Haryana; 
in  the  case  of  Punjab  it  is  as  high  as  190  percent;  and  for 
Maharasthra  it  is  135  percent.  Evidently  the  impression  that  has 
gone  round  that  the  advanced,  "better  performing"  states  are not 
getting their due from the centre does not seem to be well founded.  
Going by the normative approach, Bihar should be getting more than 
twice the amount of central transfers than they are receiving now, 
while Punjab should be getting no more than 50 percent or so.  This 
has been broadly the pattern in the five preceding years 1995-2000 
which spans the award period of the Tenth Finance Commission.
 Another notable feature of the normative transfers is that for the 14 
states taken together,  the transfers if made on a normative basis 
would not only serve to bring about a reasonable parity in revenue 
capacity to meet revenue expenditures at a moderate level, these 
would help also to balance their budgets as a whole (vide Table 4). 
Although they may not be large enough to wipe out the deficits fully, 
with normative transfers the revenue budget gap of the 14 major 
states taken together would narrow down to less than 3 percent of 
their present level, while the actual transfers now meet only about 59 
percent of the actual revenue deficit of these states (Table 5).  There 
would  of  course  be  wide  variation  among  states  in  budgetary 
outcomes in  terms of balance in the revenue budget; low income 
states would have substantial surpluses while the high income states 
would  still  have  large  deficits.    This  is  because  the  level  of 
expenditures in the high income states is comparatively very high. 
Even at present, with the transfers far exceeding what they would be 
entitled to on a normative basis, the high income states are left with 
large deficits in their budget with central transfers meeting less than 
50 percent of their gap except in the case of Harayana, requiring 
them to have recourse to borrowing on a large-scale.  For Punjab, 
actual  central  transfers  meet only about 36 percent of the state's 
revenue deficit (even though as Table 3 shows the actual transfers 
exceed the normatively warranted transfers by over 90 percent.  In 
Bihar on the other hand actual transfers cover only about 78 percent 
of their revenue deficit (Table 5); with normative transfers, the state 
would have a sizable revenue account surplus (Table 4).19
 Normative  transfers  meant  to  bring  up  the  level  of  revenue 
expenditure of all states to at least that of the average of the middle-
income states would require the devolution of a much larger share of 
the centre's revenue than is taking place now.  Table 2 shows that 
the  proportion  of  revenue  transfer  to  the  14  major  states  to  the 
centre's revenue which currently stands at about 27 percent will need 
to go up to about 44 percent if normative equalisation is to come 
about.  
To have an idea of what would be the increase needed in the 
aggregate  revenue  transfers  that  is,  taking  all  other  states  also  into 
account  (including  the  special  category  states)  a  rough  estimate  was 
made by adding the actual transfers to the other states that is special 
category states and Goa to the normatively determined transfers for the 
14  states.  (Because  of  limitations  of  time  it  was  not  possible  to 
investigate what would be the implication of the normative approach in 
the case of special category states). It seems that normative equalisation 
would require raising the share of the states in the centre's revenue to 
more than 50 percent as against the present level of 34 percent (Table 
2).  The EFC had suggested a ceiling of 37.5 percent as the states' share 
in central revenues to enable them to bridge their overall revenue gap 
(taking  plan  and  non-plan  budgets  together).    Given  the  tight  fiscal 
situation  facing  the  centre,  enhancing  the  states'  share  to  over  50 
percent would seem to be a rather tall order.  However, it needs to be 
pointed out that the finances of the states had to take a severe beating in 
recent years partly because of the sluggish growth of central revenues 
and a decline in the volume of tax devolution as compared to what was 
envisaged by the EFC.  
Our exercises suggest that the states' share in central revenue 
even  if  determined  normatively  would  not  be  more  than  43  percent 
provided the buoyancy of the tax revenue of the centre with respect to 
GDP  increased  to 1.15 as against 0.91 registered during the nineties 
(EFC Report para 2.24). The EFC had posited a target of 10.28 percent 
as the ratio for the centre's gross tax revenue to GDP at the end of the 
period 2000-2005 as against 8.8 percent that obtained in 1999-2000.  If 
this target cannot be achieved, there are three possible alternatives.  
One is to require the centre to devolve a minimum amount of 
revenue to the states in  terms of the proportion of GDP which would 
ensure equalisation at a reasonable level subject to a floor in absolute 20
terms. (The transfers may be made on the basis of projected growth of 
GDP in a given year to be adjusted later)  The other alternative is to 
stagger the equalisation by scaling down the norm of per capita revenue 
expenditure of states which are below the average of the middle level to 
no more than 90 percent or so in the initial years.  Another alternative is 
to cut down the revenue expenditure of the states on the Plan side.  A 
large part of the Plan expenditure of both the centre and the states now 
fall under the category of "revenue" that is current expenditure (around 
60 percent in the case of the states, vide Annexure Table II.8 of EFC 
Report).  In the absence of any surplus on non-plan revenue account this 
is  financed  entirely  by  borrowing  and  this  has  been  held  as  a  prime 
destablishing  factor  for  the  state  budgets  by  both  the  Tenth  and  the 
Eleventh FC.  If the states' share in centre's  revenue cannot be raised 
very substantially because of poor growth of union revenues, the states' 
budgets  cannot  be  brought  into  balance  unless  their  revenue 
expenditures under the Plan are trimmed substantially (of course such 
trimming must occur on the non-plan side too) .  As shown below this 
should not be too difficult to achieve.
Of  the total share of the states in the centre's revenue which 
was  sought  to  be  capped  by  the  EFC  (at  37.5  percent)  around  22 
percentage  points  were  on  account  of  tax  devolution,  and  about  2 
percentage points are made up of statutory (Article  275) grants while 
Plan grants constitute around 10-11 percentage points.  The rest is made 
up  of  discretionary  grants.    Of  the  Plan  grants  an  increasingly  large 
proportion is now made up of assistance for central plan and centrally-
sponsored schemes. There are some 200 and odd schemes at present 
and these are universally regarded as distortionary and disruptive of the 
states' expenditure priorities.  While there can be a good case for some 
of  the  centrally  sponsored  schemes  on  grounds  of  externalities,  the 
operation  of  so  many  schemes  is  scarcely  justifiable  on  any  ground.  
These could easily be scaled down and the amounts spent by the centre 
on this account transferred to the states.  That apart, the transfers by 
way of central assistance for the state plans which are given under the 
Gadgil formula also have come to be regarded in reality as nothing but 
support for the non-Plan revenue expenditures.  These could be done 
away with and replaced with scheme-based support as was the practice 
before  1969.    The  case  for  designing  the  transfers  on  externality 
consideration on schematically and with matching component rather than 
following a formula is argued forcefully in Akerlof (1969). 21
In  other  words  rationalisation  of  the  transfer  system  and 
restoration of fiscal balance in the states will not be possible without a 
radical  review  of  the  practice  of  planning,  plan  financing  and  central 
assistance  for  the  state  plans.    In  any  case,  while  determining  the 
revenue needs of the states normatively it is necessary to take a holistic 
view  and  do  away  with  the  plan  and  non-plan  distinction  in  revenue 
expenditures, which is a source of other distortions in the expenditure 
priorities  of  both  the  centre  and  the  states.    Until  that  happens, 
rationalisation of the transfer system will not be possible. However, given 
the  way  fiscal  reforms  are  proceeding  in  the  country,  such  a  radical 
departure from the past practices would seem to be a distant goal and so 
one has to explore how rationalisation can be brought about within the 
existing framework of revenue transfers for plan and non-plan budgets 
separately.  As will be seen from the discussion that follows even that 
would be a challenging task.
Using  some  aggregative  norms  of  revenue  expenditure  as 
indicated in the appendix, the actual statutory transfers as a proportion of 
the  transfers  to  meet  non-plan  revenue  gap  estimated  normatively 
(hereafter called normative statutory transfer) are shown in Table 6.  The 
picture that emerges is almost similar to that for aggregate (plan and 
non-plan) transfers depicted in Table 3.  Overall, during the last three 
years on the average the actual transfers form about 62 percent of the 
normative statutory transfers (Table 6).  For all middle and low income 
states the proportion is no more than 70 percent or so whereas for some 
of the high income states the proportion is well above 100 percent.
As  in  the  case  of  aggregate  transfers  (plan  plus  non-plan), 
normatively determined statutory transfers would help to bridge the non-
plan revenue deficit for the 14 states combined to the extent of about 93 
percent (Table 7) although there would be sharp variations in the non-
plan budgetary outcome of individual states.  Low and middle income 
states (barring Kerala and W.Bengal) would be left with a surplus while 
high income states would have deficits, since they would not be entitled 
to any transfer as their own revenue should suffice to meet their revenue 
expenditure at the level of middle income states.  Again, as in the case of 
aggregate normative transfers, even statutory transfers determined on 
the normative basis would require substantial increase in the share of the 
states in central revenues, from around 19-20 percent at present to over 
29 percent (vide Table 8).  This would seem to be an impossible task 
given  the  centre's  revenue  situation  and  expenditure  commitments.  22
However, if the centre's revenue growth improves and the buoyancy of 
centre's tax revenue goes up, the task may not be impossible.  Also, one 
could  consider  some  phasing  in  equalisation  such  as  going  in  for 
equalisation at a lower level to start with.  
The main problem however would be reducing the quantum of 
transfers to the high income states who do not qualify for any transfer on 
a normative basis.  This is because, the system of statutory transfer as it 
has evolved since independence has tended to rely increasingly on tax 
devolution rather than Article 275 grants.  So much so that nearly 90 
percent of the statutory transfer now flow as 'tax devolution' and only the 
rest (10 percent) goes as grants-in-aid to states in need of assistance to 
meet their budget gaps.  This leaves little room for equalisation because, 
however progressive the devolution formula may be, it is not possible to 
tailor tax devolution to meet only the normatively determined revenue 
gaps.  Besides, under the constitution, union tax revenues are required 
to be shared compulsorily with the states although the exact share is left 
to  be  determined  by  the  FC.    One  reason  for such tax sharing is to 
compensate the states for the limitation of their revenue base with the 
assignment  of  major  tax  powers  to  the  centre.    Tax  devolution  thus 
partakes  of  the  character  of  revenue  reimbursement  grant.    That 
provided  the  rationale  for  attaching  some  weight  to  "collection"  or 
"contribution"  in  the  devolution  formula.    As  mentioned  earlier,  that 
practice has now been given up.  All states should be entitled to a share 
in central revenue by way of tax devolution even if they are found not to 
qualify for any transfer on a normative basis.  It would not be possible to 
deny any state of a share in Union taxes and so equalisation cannot be 
carried beyond a point.  However, this only underlines the need to roll 
back the share of tax devolution in the statutory transfers. Clearly, the 
transfer  system  cannot  be  rationalised  unless  the  tax  devolution 
component of the statutory trnasfers is drastically reduced.  It should be 
realised  that the whole exercise of assessing the revenue gap of the 
states which is done by the FCs, even though done in a limited way, 
loses  its  significance  when  several  states  are  left  with  substantial 
surpluses on their non-plan  revenue  account, after their share in union 
taxes is added to their own revenue base.
If however, a radical reform as proposed above does not seem 
feasible,  it  would  be  desirable  to  supplement  the  non-plan  revenue 
transfers  with  some  basic  services  equalisation  grants  to  enable  the 
states with below average revenue capacity (even with statutory transfer) 23
to be in a position to bring up only the level of some basic services, like 
primary education, health, water supply and sanitation, to the average 
level of expenditure under these heads. As mentioned earlier, even with 
the inclusion of the share in central taxes recommended by the EFC in 
its revenues, Bihar's per capita revenue capacity would be no more than 
60 percent of the average.  Non-plan  per capita revenue expenditure as 
projected by the EFC also revealed wide disparity among the states. (in 
Bihar Rs. 724 as against Rs. 1547 of Gujarat, Rs. 1769 in Punjab).  Even 
if  the average ratio  of the states' spending on basic  services to their 
revenue capacity was used as the norm for determining how much Bihar 
should  spend  on  the  services  in  question if its revenue capacity was 
raised to the average level, it was found that there would still remain a 
large per capita deficiency in Bihar as compared to the average and this 
was true of all the low income states (M.P., U.P., and Orissa).  Clearly 
there was a case for transfer specifically to equalise these services.
It may not be out of place to mention that equalisation of the 
standards of basic services was postulated by the First FC as one of the 
principles to guide the grants-in-aid to states contemplated under Article 
275 of the Constitution.  However, the First FC made recommendations
for such grants to provide funds for expanding only primary eduction. 
This lead was not followed by the subsequent FCs until the Sixth FC.  
The  case  for  focussing  on  equalisation  of  basic  services  instead  of 
merely filling the budget gap of the states was put forward cogently by 
Gulati (1987) while he was a member of that Commission.  
The  ToR  of  the  Sixth  FC  had  for  the  first  time  asked  the 
Commission  to  consider  providing grants for upgrading administrative 
services in the backward states.  This, it was argued by Gulati, opened 
up the room for giving grants for improving the level of social services as 
well.  There were several ways in which the statutory transfer scheme 
could be designed to promote this objective but it was not possible to 
proceed far in the direction of equalisation unless the proportion of tax 
devolution in the statutory transfers was brought down.  One way could 
be,  it  was  suggested by Gulati to restrict  tax devolution only at what 
would  be  required  to  maintain  social  services  at  the  minimum  level 
observed  among  the  states.    The  suggestion  apparently  did  not  find 
favour with the other members of Sixth FC.  However, the Sixth FC did 
extend  the  ambit  of  grants-in-aid  to  upgrade  not  only  administrative 
services of backward states or the level of asset maintenance but also 
selected  social  services  like  education,  medical  services  and  public 24
health.  One notable outcome of this endeavour was that the proportion 
of tax devolution in the statutory transfers recommended by the Sixth FC 
came down to 62 percent as against 85 percent earlier as that of grants-
in-aid  went  up  to  38  percent  as  against  15  percent.    But  this  was 
shortlived.  The weight of tax devolution in the statutory transfers went up 
again and has received above 80 percent thereafter (Bagchi, 2002).  It is 
time a fresh look was taken at the relative weights of tax devolution and 
grants-in-aid in the FC's package if the system of revenue transfer is to 
be rationalised.
V.  Conclusions
Even if the revenue transfers are based strictly on objectively 
derived  norms,  and  not  on  'history'  the  question  that  needs  to  be 
addressed squarely  is, will that suffice to take care of the problem of 
incentives?  What is the guarantee that the states receiving much larger 
transfers than before will adhere to the norms and not go soft on their 
revenue effort or in the matter of spending?  Will the states that will be 
receiving  much  larger  amounts  from  the  centre  under  the  proposed 
scheme fulfil the expectation of providing higher level of public services 
or  will  they  develop  the  dependency  syndrome  noticed  among  the 
Atlantic provinces of Canada and also Special Category States in India?  
After all, it is asked, time and again, how seriously have the states taken 
the FC's projections in the past?
8   It is also argued that equalisation will 
put  a  premium  on  'remaining  poor'  and  discriminatory  against  states 
showing better performance in development.
In our view, doubts about the value or even credibility of FC's 
projections of revenue and expenditures of the states (and the centre) 
are based on a misperception of the role of the FC.  The FCs, it needs to 
be appreciated, are not supposed to anticipate how the states will frame 
their  budget; their task clearly is to adjudicate the sharing of revenue 
between the centre and the states and their allocation among the States 
in a judicious manner.  So their projections cannot be faulted if they turn 
out to be wide of the actuals.  The real weakness of the FC's approach 
has  been,  as  correctly  pointed  out  by  critics,  the  absence  of  a  truly 25
normative approach and their inability to get free of the 'tyranny of the 
base year'.  It is not surprising that the states pay little attention to the 
FC's projections when they know that these would go into the "dustbin of 
history", once a new commission is appointed.  This would not happen if 
the base year figures are also set up normatively.  The incentives for 
fiscal  discipline  implicit  in  the  norms  will  however  not  work,  even  if 
calibrated carefully, unless the implementation of the FC's dispensation 
is backed by a hard budget constraint.
It  is  now generally  agreed that the most  effective remedy for 
imprudent subnational  borrowing is market-based control that requires 
the states to adhere to norms of fiscal prudence unavoidably.  Until an 
efficient capital market comes into being, there would be a role for some 
hierarchical control over the states' borrowing (Anand, Bagchi, and Sen, 
2001).   But such controls should  be exercised in  a transparent,  rules 
based  way  and  not  through  a secretive bilateral agreements with the 
centre.
This  is  not  to  deny  that  there  can  be  a  case  for  attaching 
conditionality  to  equalisation  transfers  in  one  respect  viz.,  the 
requirement to maintain proper accounts.  India's Constitution contains 
elaborate provision for requiring governments at all levels to observe the 
rules regarding maintenance of accounts and fiscal prudence and adhere 
to the expenditure limits laid down by the legislature.  The C&AG has 
been  given  a  constitutional  status  with  authority  to  oversee  the 
maintenance of accounts and observance of rules of  financial behaviour 
by all governments.  However, the checks on improvident spending do 
not appear to be working as effectively as they should have.  There is 
considerable  room  for  tightening  the  requirements  for  maintaining 
accounts in government.
Conditionalities can be attached only to specific purpose grants 
for which there is a case because of externalities.  A good deal of caution 
is however needed in using specific purpose grants because of, the fact 
that quantifying externalities is a formidable task.  It is salutary to note 
that both in USA and Canada there is a move in recent years to replace 
specifically targeted grants with block grants and equalisation transfers 
because  of  the  problems  inherent  in  designing such grants efficiently 
(Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997).  Specific purpose grants are no doubt used 
in  a  big  way  in  Australia  but  this  practice  has  come  under  severe 
criticism  from  experts  in  federal  finance  primarily  on  the  ground  that 26
these are centralising, and distort the expenditure priorities of the states.
9  
The  proliferation  of  the  centrally  sponsored  schemes  in  India  and 
persistent  criticisms  about  their  wasteful  and  distortionary  impact  on 
state  finances  bear  eloquent  testimony  to  the  misgivings  about  the 
wisdom of relying too heavily on such grants.  
There  can  however  be  a  case  for  conditionalities  for  loans 
extended  by  the  centre.    Again,  caution  is  needed  to  see  that  such 
conditionalities are not used to impose centre's expenditure preferences 
and priorities when there are no obvious externalities or to favour states 
politically aligned to the government at the centre.  This is particularly 
important in the era of coalition governments and the findings of research 
that suggest that political alignment can be a significant factor influencing 
the flow of funds from the centre (Khemani, 2003).
The question still remains, if the share of the poorer states in 
central revenues is enlarged as much as the normative approach would 
require,  and  that  of  the  richer  states  reduced,  will  that  not  be 
discriminatory  against  the  better  performing  states  and  thus  be 
detrimental  to  the  growth  of  the  economy?  While  the  reasoning 
underlying this poser looks persuasive, it overlooks the possibility that 
improvement in the level of public services like health and education may 
unleash  the  growth  potential  of  the  regions  that  are  lagging  behind.  
Keeping them poor also may not be in the larger interests of the nation or 
even the best interest of the states that are already advanced.  It would 
of course not be reasonable to expect all regions to attain the same level 
of development irrespective of their endowment.  However, equalising 
the level of public services is necessary to prevent migration lured by 
better  living  conditions  in  the  richer  regions  and  also  as  a  matter  of 
"categorical equity"  as Musgrave (1999) insists.  The better off states 
should not grudge the flow of larger central funds to the poorer states as 
the bulk of the resources from other sources like private investment and 
FDI  are  flowing  to  areas  that  are  already  doing  well,  as  the  Deputy 
Chairman, Planning Commission had pointed out in his address at the 
Golden Jubilee function of the FC in April 2003. 
It should be recognised that providing the backward states with 
transfers justifiable in a normative framework is a necessary, though not 
sufficient  condition  for  raising  their  living  conditions,  and  thereby  the 
environment for activities that spur growth; for the transfers to work there 
has to be an improvement in governance as well.  Ultimately it is the 27
democratic process and inter-state competition that can bring it about. In 
the last analysis, the task of fiscal transfers is to provide a level playing 
field. What is required is not giving the poor less because they are poor 
but to see that they use the transfers properly.  There should be other 
ways to punish financial mismanagement (such as financial emergency 
in specified situations) than keeping them at a low level of help.
To sum up, the scheme of centre-state revenue transfer in India 
needs  to  be  reformed  if  the  goals  of  efficiency  and  equity  are  to be 
served.  The changes that seem imperative are:
 Integration of transfers, combining transfers for meeting expenditure 
needs on both plan and non-plan accounts, bringing both under the 
purview of FC.
 Determination  of  the  revenue  gap  of  the  states  on  a  normative 
assessment of revenue capacity and expenditure needs, with a view 
to  equalising  revenue  capacity  and  expenditures  at  a  reasonably 
comparable level in all states.
 Providing special grants to equalise the level of basic social services 
like,  primary  health,  education,  water  supply  and  sanitation  at  a 
reasonable level.
 Imposition of a hard budget constraint and market based control on 
the states in the matter of borrowing, combined with requirements to 
maintain proper accounts
Reform  on  these  lines  would  call  for  a  radical  change  in  the 
approach of the FC and also the strategy of planning followed so far.  
Given  our  'path  dependence'  these  may  look  impracticable  in  the 
foreseeable future.  However, some fundamental rethinking on how the 
transfer system should operate is long overdue.  This paper is a modest 
attempt to explore the directions in which the reforms should proceed.28
Table 1: Per Capita Revenue Capacity











Non Special Category States (NSCS)
1.   Andhra Pradesh 2186 2552 2981 3481 4083
2.   Bihar 1290 1469 1672 1902 2182
3.   Goa 4588 5253 6000 6865 7886
4.   Gujarat 2861 3333 3881 4515 5264
5.   Haryana 2767 3233 3778 4407 5143
6.   Karnataka 2523 2909 3353 3864 4476
7.   Kerala 2686 3121 3621 4194 4869
8.   Madhya Pradesh 1762 2003 2279 2596 2970
9.   Maharashtra  2729 3210 3776 4435 5213
10. Orissa 1656 1791 2114 2330 2678
11. Punjab 2715 2981 3452 3996 4643
12. Rajasthan 2007 2158 2423 2790 3228
13. Tamil Nadu 2812 3259 3776 4374 5095
14. Uttar Pradesh 1419 1567 1803 2072 2388
15. West Bengal 1789 1960 2188 2456 2854
Total NSCS (Av.) 2042 2322 2676 3082 3576
Special Category States (SCS)
16.  Arunachal Pradesh  3973 4167 4360 4568 5025
17.  Assam 1537 1702 1934 2193 2501
18.  Himachal Pradesh 3624 3830 4060 4266 4536
19. Jammu & Kashmir 3950 4244 4420 4680 5025
20. Manipur 2557 2678 2797 2929 3120
21. Meghalaya 2907 3047 3217 3338 3535
22. Mizoram 5059 5306 5551 5948 6240
23. Nagaland 4950 5166 5467 5608 5945
24. Sikkim 6328 6645 6965 7311 7816
25. Tripura 2402 2517 2650 2755 2910
Total SCS 2643 2840 3056 3289 3587
90% of Total SCS 2379 2556 2750 2960 3228
* Based on projections made by EFC taking statutory transfers and
   own source revenues together.29










Andhra Pradesh 146242 642669 1118520
Bihar 250372 1221903 1920068
Gujarat 48102 148114 354874
Haryana 18036 41011 121004
Karnataka 95483 435626 705617
Kerala 63633 284310 414718
Madhya Pradesh 141310 786132 1140961
Maharashtra 78677 94562 365326
Orissa 82829 380995 749069
Punjab 7994 60396 102936
Rajasthan 93468 468291 941053
Tamil Nadu 94237 492449 946938
Uttar Pradesh 341996 1746515 2963309
West Bengal 128481 644330 967241
All States 1590860 7447301 12811634
Normative Tr. As  % of 
Centre' Rev.
33.14 38.73 44.36
Normative Tr. As % of 
Centre' Norm. Rev.
33.14 37.14 37.45
Norm Tr. As % of Centre's 
Rev. incl. SCS
41.96 47.23 51.86
Norm. Tr. As % of Centre's 
Norm. Rev. incl. SCS
41.96 45.34 43.78
Act. Trans.(14 St.) as  % to 
Centre's Rev.
30.36 25.97 26.87
Act. Trans Incl SCS. As % to 
Centre's Rev.
39.18 34.47 34.37
             Note: SCS= Special Category States
           * Upto 2002-03 (the figures for the year 2002-03 are taken from BE).30
Table 3: Actual Revenue Transfers as a as a Percentage of 
Normative Transfers










Andhra Pradesh 78.95 77.70 66.46
Bihar 64.95 47.06 42.77
Gujarat 171.72 165.70** 110.63
Haryana 144.96 107.83** 99.27
Karnataka 73.82 65.52 65.82
Kerala 74.23 69.46 65.20
Madhya Pradesh 86.39 56.61 61.35
Maharashtra 149.29 179.63** 135.75
Orissa 95.41 69.89 65.15
Punjab 343.97 207.35** 190.11
Rajasthan 111.38 73.06 57.97
Tamil Nadu 109.68 74.47 48.21
Uttar Pradesh 79.30 51.74 47.62
West Bengal 99.78 60.62 79.34
All States 91.62 68.64 60.56
** Extreme values are excluded in the calculation of average.31











Andhra Pradesh 130.87 100.52 106.52
Bihar 202.29 182.54 188.09
Gujarat 43.23 34.56 34.38
Haryana 73.59 19.27 64.31
Karnataka 117.02 123.08 99.61
Kerala 95.41 86.61 81.59
Madhya Pradesh 113.83 132.60 141.30
Maharashtra 71.47 8.93 32.28
Orissa 95.78 92.86 108.96
Punjab 15.87 18.85 22.10
Rajasthan 66.90 94.48 107.18
Tamil Nadu 71.58 89.84 107.94
Uttar Pradesh 139.03 125.20 143.51
West Bengal 91.95 90.18 62.15
All States 102.79 96.44 97.6532











Andhra Pradesh 103.32 75.10 70.88
Bihar 131.39 85.32 77.82
Gujarat 74.24 64.76 37.02
Haryana 106.68 50.73 54.87
Karnataka 86.39 81.22 65.39
Kerala 70.82 60.81 53.15
Madhya Pradesh 98.35 75.02 81.29
Maharashtra 106.70 61.05 42.08
Orissa 91.38 64.43 70.91
Punjab 54.58 39.70 36.10
Rajasthan 74.51 69.03 62.15
Tamil Nadu 78.51 66.94 52.05
Uttar Pradesh 110.24 64.24 68.29
West Bengal 91.75 55.13 49.22
All States 94.17 66.06 59.1333











Andhra Pradesh 98.94 88.26 59.40
Bihar 71.08 48.70 47.76
Gujarat 760.05 242.25 150.90
Haryana 812.13 21.62 92.28
Karnataka 92.88 72.48 62.26
Kerala 91.35 75.55 72.87
Madhya Pradesh 111.91 57.39 61.45
Maharashtra ** 93.31 162.71
Orissa 105.82 66.64 56.20
Punjab ** 177.71 65.13
Rajasthan 91.65 70.60 54.42
Tamil Nadu 185.85 91.44 46.10
Uttar Pradesh 93.99 55.83 50.96
West Bengal 165.51 67.55 104.41
All States 117.87 73.65 62.29
 * Comprising tax devolution and grants-in-aid under Article 275 
 of the Constitution
** The normative transfers for these states work out to a negative figure.34
Table 7: Normative Non-Plan Transfer as a Percentage of
 Actual Deficits









Andhra Pradesh 227.09 112.72 147.14
Bihar 330.36 176.67 166.12
Gujarat 21.08 10.36 16.11
Haryana 71.48 7.72 51.63
Karnataka 263.09 202.05 137.99
Kerala 81.06 115.83 89.63
Madhya Pradesh 176.61 167.37 160.00
Maharashtra 0.00 2.06 2.06
Orissa 113.36 112.55 114.75
Punjab 0.00 5.27 4.04
Rajasthan 84.75 93.77 103.42
Tamil Nadu 95.40 106.98 118.91
Uttar Pradesh 159.85 121.41 132.90
West Bengal 68.81 80.03 47.89
All States 136.51 104.96 93.0135











Andhra Pradesh 78322 434232 751945
Bihar 162069 949831 1451678
Gujarat 5529 38210 115860
Haryana 1373 9837 27013
Karnataka 49115 292388 451446
Kerala 33054 194879 259827
Madhya Pradesh 74329 569029 775593
Maharashtra 0 11405 19010
Orissa 50137 281636 574979
Punjab 0 16164 12385
Rajasthan 49018 322615 673373
Tamil Nadu 35761 321564 648984
Uttar Pradesh 200783 1286720 2121361
West Bengal 59115 427408 581060
All States 798606 5155921 8464513
Normative Tr. As % 
of Centre's Rev.
16.64 26.67 29.34
Normative Tr. As % 
of Centre's Norm. 
Rev.
16.64 25.57 24.77




Note: St. Tr. = Statutory Transfers36
Appendix
The Normative Deficit Estimation Assumptions
In estimating the budget gap of the states on a normative basis, 
'norms' have to be set up for both revenues and expenditures. 
In assessing the revenue capacity of the states normatively for 
the exercises undertaken for this paper, separate norms were applied for 
tax and non-tax revenues. An examination of the tax-revenue profile of 
the fourteen states under consideration revealed wide divergence in their 
tax  effort  as  reflected  in  the tax/GSDP  ratios among them, with low-
income states as a group at the bottom and middle income states on top.  
Proceeding on the premise that all states including those in the LI group 
should be able to raise their tax ratio to the level at which most of them 
are doing, the median ratio of the 14 states was adopted as the norm for 
both MI and LI states.  For HI states, this might look a little too soft as 
taxable capacity can be expected to increase more than proportionally 
with per capita GSDP.  So we chose the group average of HI states as 
the norm in their case. 
The median tax to GSDP ratio for the period between 1995-96 
and 2000-01 worked out to be 6.40 percent and the high-income group 
average worked out to be 6.97 percent.  These were the norms used for 
the present exercise. The middle and low-income group average worked 
out to be 7.38 and 5.03 percent of GSDP respectively. 
In  the  case  of  non-tax  revenues,  the  principle  of  revenue 
recovery is taken to set up the norm.  Accordingly, the ratio of own non-
tax  revenue  as  a  percentage  of primary revenue expenditure (that is 
excluding pension) of the fourteen states was calculated. Like in the case 
of tax effort, estimated recovery profile shows wide divergence across 
states. It was also noticed that there has been a steady decline in the 
recovery ratio across states irrespective of their income groups over the 
years. In order to set up norms for non-tax revenues, we assumed that 
both middle and low-income states should mobilize revenue to the level 
of  the  best  performing  states  in  their  respective  groups.  As  the  best 
performing high-income states has a recovery ratio much above that of 
other states in the group, the application of best performance norm of 37
high-income group appeared to be too harsh. Thus, we reasoned that 
these states should achieve the average performance at a level of 20 
percent, which is the average of the recovery performance ratio of high 
and middle income states. 
On the revenue expenditure side, separate norms were applied 
for primary general service expenditure excluding pension, expenditure 
on social services and economic services. In the case of pensions, the 
normative principle was not applied and actual pension expenditure was 
added to the normative general service expenditure. Interest payment 
has been measured in terms of the intensity of debt burden, viz., interest 
payment  as  a  percentage  of  revenue  receipts  and  normative interest 
payment is estimated at the minimum of the ratio (among the fourteen 
states)  in  each  year.  In  the  case  of  primary  general  services,  social 
services and economic services, the per capita expenditure of the middle 
income states was applied as the norm.39
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End Notes
1  A concise and incisive critique of India's transfer system is presented in Rao 
and Sen (1996, Ch. 6).
2 For instance in his presentation to the Twelfth Finance Commission, the Chief 
Minister of Andhra Pradesh is reported to have urged that the states' share in 
union taxes be raised to 50 percent  (The Hindu, 23 August, 2003).
3  See for instance the articles in Ahmad (ed.) (1997); Bird and Smart (2002); 
Oates (1999); and Musgrave (1999).
4  As a proportion of centre's revenue, aggregate transfers to the states work out 
to 34.9 percent in 2000-01, 33.14 percent in 2001-02 and 34.00 percent in 2002-
03 [according to revised estimates (RE) figures].
5  The Article runs as follows:  "Parliament and the Government of Canada are 
committed  to  the  principle  of  making  equalization  payments  to  ensure  that 
provincial  governments  have  sufficient  revenues  to  provide  reasonably 
comparable  levels  of  public  services  at  reasonably  comparable  levels  of 
taxation".
6  Burbridge and Myers (1994) provide an analysis along these lines.
7  Equalisation transfers in Canada are confined to revenue capacity equalisation 
only  while  Australia's  transfer  scheme  takes  expenditure  needs  also  into 
consideration.    The  formulae  used  in  Australia  are  however,  quite  complex 
(Shah, 1996).
8  Vide for example, Godbole (2001).
9    To  quote  Petchy,  Shabiro  and  Walsh  (1997):  "……..  while  there  may  be 
theoretical  justifications,  based  on  the  presence  of  externalities,  for  centrally 
mandated specific purpose transfers from the Centre to the states, in practice 
there are other reasons why such transfers are made.  They have also been 
used to achieve backdoor centralisation of expenditure powers and hence get 
around constitutional and other limitations on the reach of central powers". (P-S-
W, 1997, p. 106). 